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ABSTRACT 
 
 Novel, or uncommon, responses in idea generation, creative problem solving, 
and divergent thinking are difficult to generate because they experience reduced memory 
accessibility caused by blocking or fixation from common, pre-potent responses.  
Research has demonstrated that fixation in problem solving can be alleviated through 
memory inhibition by reducing accessibility of pre-potent responses serving as incorrect 
answers.  Based on this finding, the present investigation tested whether failed retrieval 
attempts, such as those used to demonstrate retrieval-induced-forgetting, could reduce 
accessibility of pre-potent responses and alleviate fixation in category generation, 
resulting in increased generation of novel responses.  Three experiments demonstrated 
greater average novelty of generated members of categories that received impossible 
retrieval practice, in which participants failed to retrieve a member, than for those that 
did not. These results offer potential avenues of study into mechanisms for improving 
divergent thinking and creative problem solving. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
 Mental fixation in creative problem solving, idea generation, and divergent 
thinking arises when novel or creative responses are inaccessible due to overriding 
accessibility of pre-potent, common responses (Smith, 2003).  It has been demonstrated 
that forgetting the misleading and irrelevant pre-potent responses can assist in 
overcoming mental fixation and facilitate problem solving (e.g., Angello, Storm, & 
Smith, 2014; Smith & Blankenship, 1989; Storm & Angello, 2010; Storm, Angello. & 
Bjork, 2011).  Although these studies have shed light on the connection between keeping 
incorrect answers out of mind and successful problem solving, they have yet to 
demonstrate the benefit of forgetting of counterproductive information for idea 
generation or divergent thinking tasks.  Because there is evidence that forgetting is 
useful in creative problem solving, it seems reasonable that this forgetting can also help 
improve the quality of idea generation, such as the ability to generate more novel, less 
dominant members of a category.  An investigation into the forgetting mechanisms that 
can result in access to novel category members can also offer possible avenues for 
exploring the benefit of forgetting for various other types of problem solving that require 
overcoming fixation in creative idea generation, such as engineering design (e.g., 
Jansson & Smith, 1991) and clinical diagnostic decision making (e.g., Croskerry, 2003; 
de Vries, Witteman, Holland, & Dijksterhuis, 2010).   
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2. OVERCOMING FIXATION IN CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 
 
2.1  Introduction  
          It has been argued that creative problem solving and creative idea generation 
performance can improve with intuition, what is referred to as “a means of discovering 
basic truths without any conscious activity of the mind” (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & 
Parker, 1990, p.73).  Similarly, a moment of insight is typically associated with the 
subjective experience of an idea suddenly coming to mind without immediately prior 
conscious work.  Consistent with this view, an explanation for the subjective experience 
of surprise following the discovery of a novel idea is that unconscious work was 
occurring outside of awareness to bring mental effort closer to the solution (e.g., Bowers 
et al., 1990; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Moss, Kotovsky, & Cagan, 2007; Seifert, Meyer, 
Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995; but see Weisberg & Alba, 1981).  The novel idea is 
then realized once attentional focus is shifted back toward the task.  Pushing this idea 
further, some even argue for an “autonomous unconscious work” mechanism to move 
iteratively toward the solution.  “It may ‘feel’ as if the answer is suddenly presented to 
consciousness, however, before the answer becomes conscious, the unconscious is 
clearly thinking about it. It is, as it were already approaching the target” (Dijksterhuis & 
Meurs, 2006, p. 137).   
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2.2  Incidental Hints 
          Research exploring theories of insight tends to focus on possible mechanisms that 
allow for work toward the correct solution.  For example, studies have offered evidence 
for a means to overcome fixation, or blocking caused by incorrect solutions, by 
presenting incidental hints (e.g., Hattori, Sloman, & Orita, 2013; Moss et al., 2007; 
Seifert et al., 1995).  Moss et al. (2007) demonstrated successful problem resolution (i.e., 
solving initially failed problems) following an incubation period, or a period of time 
spent away from the problem, when the solution was presented to problem solvers 
during incubation without their awareness of the solution’s relation to previously 
unsolved problems.   
          According to the idea of opportunistic assimilation, Seifert et al. (1995) argued 
that initial failed attempts at solving a problem sensitize that problem.  When an 
environmental cue that is relevant to the solution is encountered serendipitously, the cue 
may trigger enough unconscious activation of the solution to bring it to conscious 
awareness.  Evidence for opportunistic assimilation includes studies that have found 
greater resolution of remote associate test (RAT; Mednick, 1962) problems or general-
information questions after the actual solutions were presented in an incidental task (e.g., 
Moss et al., 2007; Seifert et al., 1995).  A RAT problem includes three seemingly 
unrelated words, such as manners, tennis, round, and the RAT problem solution is a 
fourth word that is uniquely related to each of the three problem words (e.g., table).  
This problem recruits creative thinking because the most common associates for each 
problem word (e.g., polite, ball, square) are misleading and incorrect, and more distant, 
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or “remote” associates must be generated for the problem words before converging on 
the solution. Dodds, Smith, and Ward (2002) and Smith, Sifonis, and Angello (2012) 
also presented incidental hints prior to attempts to re-solve RAT problems.  The hints in 
these studies, however, were semantically related to the answers (e.g., chair), rather than 
the actual answers.  These hints failed to improve resolution, which suggests a limitation 
of the opportunistic assimilation theory.  That is, evidence to date only shows that 
incidentally presented solutions can trigger resolution, but that cues that are semantically 
related to solutions do not.  
          The incidental hint account for a means to overcome fixation does not require a 
mechanism such as autonomous unconscious work.  However, it fails to account for 
successful creative problem solving in the absence of presented hints.  Next I will 
consider the forgetting fixation explanation for overcoming fixation.  Unlike both 
autonomous unconscious work and incidental hints, forgetting fixation accounts for 
facilitation in performance not because the solver was somehow brought closer to the 
solution but because the solver was able to move further away from the wrong answer.   
2.3  Forgetting Fixation 
          Prior to the moment of insight, counterproductive thoughts can mislead or distract 
thinking away from an appropriate and useful novel idea.  Smith (1995) described the 
perception of these attempts in which “we sometimes start spinning our mental wheels, 
that is, we work harder and harder at a frustrating problem, but succeed only in getting 
deeper into a mental rut” (p. 229).  Forgetting the misleading information can help 
remove us from the mental rut and allow subsequent novel ideas to come to mind 
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relatively easily when compared to the progress of generating poor ideas that continue to 
reinforce each other, pushing us deeper into the rut and further away from insight.  The 
forgetting fixation hypothesis specifies that during a break, or time spent away from 
working on the problem, forgetting can take place for the fixating information that was 
blocking the problem solver from accessing the solution (Smith & Blankenship, 1989, 
1991).  This hypothesis, unlike the incidental hint account, does not rely on work 
bringing the problem solver closer to the solution.  Instead, it simply explains how 
misleading and interfering information can be forgotten so that when the initially 
unsolved problem is reattempted following the break, productive work can occur 
incrementally without one becoming misled by irrelevant information. 
          Smith and Blankenship (1989, 1991) primed participants with incorrect answers, 
and demonstrated that previously unsolved problems were more likely to be resolved on 
a second attempt following an incubation interval—a  break from problem solving, when 
compared with immediate attempts at resolving problems.  Further support for the 
forgetting fixation hypothesis was shown by Smith and Blankenship (1989) with greater 
forgetting of incorrect answers associated with problems assigned to longer incubation 
intervals.  Importantly, improvement in creative problem solving following the 
incubation period, in the absence of incidental hints, has been found only when 
participants were initially primed with incorrect answers (Smith & Blankenship, 1989, 
1991; Vul & Pashler, 2007).  These findings suggest that problem resolution should only 
occur when the wrong answer creates a mental block to hinder access of the correct 
answer.  If problem solvers fail to access the correct answer without experiencing a 
 6 
 
 
mental block from fixation on the wrong answer, they most likely lack the fundamental 
knowledge to support the identification of the correct answer.  According to these 
findings then, the incubation interval is only effective at facilitating problem solving 
when it allows for the forgetting of misleading information.  According to the forgetting 
fixation explanation, the incubation interval does not help those participants who will 
never arrive at the answer consciously by allowing for autonomous unconscious work, 
nor does it provide opportunistic assimilation from external sources.        
          Under this forgetting fixation rationale, a novel idea can seem to suddenly appear 
in one’s mind when the idea is relatively easily generated following the forgetting 
(putting aside, even temporarily) and inaccessibility of poor ideas that previously acted 
to block access to the novel idea and caused its generation to seem difficult and nearly 
impossible.  Although, it might be necessary for the person attempting creative idea 
generation to have some understanding of which ideas are the poor ones that should be 
ignored.  Some studies suggest that certain individuals are better at forgetting or actively 
suppressing irrelevant information (e.g., Aslan & Bäuml, 2011; Levy & Anderson, 2008; 
Storm & Angello, 2010).  In the next section, I review work exploring retrieval 
inhibition as a potential mechanism of forgetting fixation in the creative problem solving 
domain. 
2.4  Retrieval Inhibition 
          Storm and Angello (2010) tested for retrieval inhibition as a skill and individual 
difference by splitting participants based on high or low levels of retrieval-induced 
forgetting.  Retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF; Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994) occurs 
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when items that compete for access during a related retrieval task are less likely to be 
recalled on a subsequent test, when compared with control items.  For example, 
participants may study category-exemplar word pairs such as fruit banana; fruit orange; 
fruit guava; fruit mango; tree birch; tree elm; tree juniper; tree ash.  Then, participants 
are given the task to retrieve half of the exemplars, such as orange and mango, from half 
of the studied categories.  In order to encourage competition from other fruits, 
participants are cued to retrieve target exemplars with the category and the first two 
letters of the target exemplar (e.g., fruit or_____, fruit ma_____).  Participants are later 
tested on all of the studied exemplars with a surprise cued-recall final test. 
          Anderson et al. (1994) first observed RIF when non-target exemplars that 
belonged to the categories presented during the retrieval task, such as banana, were 
recalled less often than control exemplars that belonged to categories that were never 
presented during the retrieval task, such as birch and elm.  They also found RIF only for 
the exemplars strongly associated with the presented category, like banana, and not for 
weakly associated non-target exemplars, such as guava.  Anderson et al. argued that 
exemplars strongly associated with the category presented during the retrieval task are 
more likely to compete for access during retrieval and are inhibited so that target 
exemplars can be retrieved.  This inhibition, then, is what causes the forgetting later 
observed on the final test (see also Anderson, 2003; Bjork, 1989; Storm, 2011; Storm & 
Levy, 2012).  Competition-dependent retrieval-induced forgetting has also been 
demonstrated using list-wise directed forgetting instructions to manipulate the 
accessibility of the non-target items competing during the retrieval task (Storm, Bjork, & 
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Bjork, 2007).  Storm et al. found greater levels of RIF for non-targets that were given 
instructions to be remembered prior to retrieval practice when compared with non-
targets given instructions to be forgotten.     
          Storm and Angello (2010) reasoned that if inhibition is the source of RIF, in that 
forgetting selectively targets items that interfere with retrieval and compete for access, a 
similar selective retrieval inhibition process might also work to suppress irrelevant 
information in problem solving.  Additionally, this inhibition could facilitate creative 
problem solving by helping push away common and stereotypical incorrect answers that 
are often sources of fixation.  To test this prediction, Storm and Angello presented 
participants with incorrect associates prior to solving RAT problems.   
          Storm and Angello (2010) found that participants who demonstrated high RIF 
were more likely to overcome fixation and solve RAT problems for which they had 
previously been exposed to misleading associates.  Low RIF participants, however, were 
less likely to overcome fixation.  These results suggest that inhibiting misleading 
information that competes for access can be a useful skill in creative thinking.  Storm et 
al. (2011) demonstrated additional support for the role of retrieval inhibition in 
facilitating creative thinking.  They found evidence of problem-solving-induced 
forgetting following RAT problem solving.  Experiment 1 showed that participants were 
more likely to forget misleading associates following RAT problem solving when 
compared with associates of problems that were never presented during RAT problem 
solving.  Furthermore, the observed problem-solving-induced forgetting was not 
contingent on RAT problem solving success.  Experiment 2 demonstrated that greater 
 9 
 
 
periods of time spent attempting to solve RAT problems resulted in greater problem-
solving-induced forgetting, suggesting that the recruitment of inhibition to counter 
fixation becomes more likely as more time is spent attempting to solve the problem.  
Experiment 3 provided additional evidence that retrieval inhibition can be a useful skill 
in creative problem solving.  They observed a positive correlation between the 
proportion of RAT problems correctly solved and the amount of problem-solving-
induced forgetting observed on a separate set of RAT problems.     
          Recently, Koppel and Storm (2014) found that the time spent away from the 
decision problem allows for better forgetting of wrong answers similarly for high and 
low RIF individuals.  This suggests that providing an incubation period appears to 
negate the need for retrieval inhibition.  If retrieval inhibition enables access to creative 
solutions that are more likely to be blocked by misleading information, there should be 
instances in which actively attempting to inhibit memory of blockers facilitates problem 
solving.   
2.5  Suppression-Induced Forgetting 
          Angello et al. (2014) tested whether fixation caused by memory blocking could be 
overcome on a word fragment completion task (e.g., Leynes, Rass, & Landau, 2008; 
Smith & Tindell, 1997), if the memory of each blocker, or wrong answer, was actively 
and intentionally suppressed using the Think/No-Think method (Anderson & Green, 
2001).  Before participants were instructed to solve single-solution word fragments (e.g., 
B _ G _ A _ E), participants studied misleading words that would later serve as negative 
primes (e.g., BRIGADE) that happened to be orthographically similar to word-fragment 
 10 
 
 
solutions (e.g., BAGGAGE).  Angello et al. reasoned that if access to these misleading 
negative primes was reduced, participants should be more likely to solve the associated 
word fragments compared to those fragments that had been negatively primed without 
repeated memory suppression attempts of associated blockers.   
          Anderson and Green (2001) first observed suppression-induced forgetting on a 
cued-recall test that followed opportunities for repeated memory suppression.  During an 
initial learning phase, participants studied cue-response pairs (e.g., ordeal-roach) and 
were tested to a criterion so that they could recall the response word when presented 
with its associated cue word.  Next, participants conducted repeated memory suppression 
trials during the Think/No-Think phase.  For some of the previously studied cue words, 
participants were asked to think of the corresponding response words (think items).  For 
critical cue words, however, participants were instructed to prevent thoughts of the 
associated response words (no-think items).  Later, when participants were tested for 
memory of the studied response words with either the original cue (e.g., ordeal-) or an 
independent probe (e.g., insect-r) significant levels of forgetting occurred for no-think 
items compared with baseline responses that had not received Think or No-Think trials.  
These results were also attributed to a retrieval inhibition mechanism that is recruited in 
order to prevent retrieval of the unwanted item (for a review, see Anderson & 
Huddleston, 2012). 
          Angello et al. (2014) had participants learn cue words (e.g., PLANET) that were 
paired with unrelated negative primes (e.g., BRIGADE).  A subset of the cue words 
served as cues on No-Think trials, while the remaining cue words associated with 
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negative primes were not assigned to No-Think trials.  Following several Think/No-
Think trials, participants were asked to solve word fragments.  Across two experiments, 
they demonstrated a memory blocking effect (e.g., Leynes et al., 2008; Smith & Tindell, 
1997), or impaired fragment completion rates for items corresponding to negative primes 
that had not been suppressed during No-Think trials.  Under the assumption that 
repeated memory suppression causes memory inhibition for responses participants must 
continue to fail to retrieve, Angello et al. hypothesized that retrieval inhibition should 
nullify the effect of blockers and reduce the memory blocking effect, thereby allowing 
access to correct answers during word fragment completion.  In Experiment 1, when 
participants were not explicitly reminded of negative primes during fragment 
completion, repeated memory suppression of primes did not nullify their blocking effect 
on word-fragment completion.  In Experiment 2, however, when participants were 
instructed to explicitly recollect primes to help solve word fragments, memory blocking 
effects were significantly reduced by repeated memory suppression of primes.  These 
results demonstrate a means to actively counter a specific type of fixation, one that is 
caused by conscious recollection of counterproductive information. 
          Angello et al. (2014) offered a possible explanation for why they failed to find 
elimination of memory blocking that was primarily due to implicit memory of negative 
primes.  They explained that memory blocking was caused by a perceptual 
representation of negative primes; whereas repeated memory suppression was carried 
out for the conceptual representation of negative primes.  The negative primes, or 
blockers, were encoded via creating an episodic association between the cue and the 
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prime, presumably with participants relying on the semantic properties of the prime.  For 
example, a participant learning that PLANET is the cue word for BRIGADE may think 
of an army of Martians marching through the mountains of Mars.  Later, if PLANET 
appeared as a cue during a No-Think trial, the participant would need to suppress the 
memory of the imagined Martian army.  However, even if the repeated memory 
suppression attempts were successful, the participant could still be implicitly primed to 
think that the fragment B _ G _ A _ E must have ADE as an ending based on the 
perceptual components of the blocker.  It still remains to be shown, then, that implicitly 
caused fixation can be successfully overcome by retrieval inhibition. 
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3. OVERCOMING FIXATION IN IDEA GENERATION 
 
3.1  Introduction  
          Unfortunately, when fixation is caused implicitly, and not by conscious 
recollection of counterproductive information, it can be difficult for people to overcome 
even when they are warned to avoid poor ideas (e.g., Jansson & Smith, 1991).  Implicitly 
caused fixation has been shown when people are blocked by presented examples and can 
only generate ideas that conform to the examples (e.g., Jansson & Smith, 1991; Smith, 
Ward, & Schumacher, 1993).  It could be possible that people were unaware of the 
influences that the presented examples seemed to be exerting on their work.  This would 
explain why an instruction to avoid conforming to the examples would be ineffective 
because it is not possible to avoid something of which you are unaware.  A mechanism 
such as memory inhibition that can reduce accessibility of dominant, pre-potent 
competitors can be a useful tool to help eliminate implicit fixation in idea generation. 
3.2  Generating Novel Responses 
          Historically, creative individuals were believed to have different mental 
representations that could permit greater accessibility to novel responses (Mednick, 
1962), thereby eliminating the need to reduce accessibility of dominant, pre-potent 
competitors.  Originally, Mednick had hypothesized that highly creative individuals 
mentally hold several items equally in association with certain concepts (e.g., chair, 
cloth, wood, leg, food, mabel are all equally likely to be generated from the word table).  
In contrast, he predicted that less-creative individuals hold certain stereotypical items 
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strongly associated with concepts and uncommon items weakly associated, or less likely 
to be retrieved in association, with certain concepts (e.g., more likely to respond with 
chair or wood than leg or food).  This model for differing associative hierarchies has 
been tested recently by Benedek and Neubauer (2013).   
          Benedek and Neubauer (2013) failed to find differences in response hierarchies 
between individuals scoring high and low on divergent thinking and other types of 
creativity measures.  Specifically, they found that both high and low creative individuals 
have a tendency to respond with common associates initially and then to respond with 
less common associates toward the end of the free association task.  However, despite 
holding a stronger associative strength for common responses compared to less common 
responses, high creative individuals were still able to generate a greater number of 
uncommon responses, suggesting a possible individual difference in ability to overcome 
fixation from pre-potent, strongly associated responses.  Benedek, Franz, Heene, and 
Neubauer (2012) found a positive correlation between performance on a cognitive 
inhibition task, random motor generation (Schulter, Mittenecker, & Papousek, 2010), 
and creativity measures of insight and idea generation ability.  Taken together, these 
results provide correlational support for the theory that individual differences in 
cognitive inhibition and executive functioning are key components in creative thinking 
by reducing access to pre-potent responses, permitting generation of novel, uncommon 
responses. 
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3.3  Current Investigation 
          Can retrieval inhibition help people overcome fixation in idea generation?  Will 
forgetting of dominant category members facilitate the generation of less dominant 
category members?  The goal of this study is to test whether reducing access via 
retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994) of unwanted exemplars 
can aid in later generation of less dominant members of the category.  It is predicted that 
more novel, less dominant, members will be generated for categories whose dominant 
members have been subjected to retrieval inhibition, resulting in reduced accessibility, 
during retrieval practice.  Furthermore, it will not be necessary for retrieval practice to 
be successful in order to observe the facilitation of novel category member generation, 
similar to the phenomenon of retrieval-induced forgetting for pre-potent category 
members following unsuccessful retrieval practice attempts (Storm, Bjork, Bjork, & 
Nestojko, 2006; Storm & Nestojko, 2010).   
          Storm et al. (2006) demonstrated retrieval-induced forgetting for studied non-
target members that were common members of the category with which they were 
studied (e.g., fruit banana).  These studied common members were assumed to be pre-
potent because they had recently been encoded and were thus expected to come to mind 
first and compete for retrieval access on a subsequent retrieval practice task.  
Importantly, and unbeknownst to themselves, participants were prompted to retrieve a 
nonexistent member of the previously studied category (e.g., fruit ge_____).  This 
impossible retrieval task in which the two-letter member stems could not be completed 
with a member of the cued category resulted in later forgetting of non-target competitors 
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that were previously studied (e.g., banana).  Storm et al. argued that this forgetting was 
the result of an executive control inhibitory mechanism that targets unwanted 
competitors and reduces their retrieval accessibility in order to facilitate retrieval of 
wanted targets (Anderson, 2003).  Furthermore, Storm et al. offered the observed 
retrieval-induced forgetting during failures to retrieve as support for retrieval inhibition 
being strength-independent and competition-dependent (see also Storm & Nestojko, 
2010).  The fact that forgetting of unwanted competing members occurred even when 
participants were unable to successfully retrieve and potentially strengthen a target 
supports the strength-independence of retrieval-induced forgetting.  Additionally, the 
observed forgetting for common members that had been recently studied with the 
categories used during impossible retrieval practice is consistent with the competition-
dependence attribute of retrieval-induced forgetting.  This study will employ an 
impossible retrieval practice task in order to avoid strengthening successfully retrieved 
target members, resulting in a biased schema for subsequent category generation.   
          The current research design will include a within-subjects factor for whether 
categories will receive impossible retrieval practice or no retrieval practice.  A subset of 
categories will receive possible retrieval practice in order to encourage retrieval attempts 
during retrieval practice trials (Storm et al., 2006; Storm & Nestojko, 2010).  The first 
two experiments will measure the total number of members generated, as well as the 
dominance, or novelty, of generated members based on the norms generated for control 
categories that never receive retrieval practice.  Novelty will be measured as the inverse 
proportion of participants generating that member, such that higher novelty scores will 
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be assigned for items generated by fewer participants.  All scores used for the reported 
analyses will be standardized by multiplying the score by 100/N.  Using a combination 
of the novelty norms from the first two experiments, the third experiment will measure 
novelty for single member responses when participants are prompted to give a creative 
response.  It is expected that novelty of generated members will be higher in all three 
experiments for categories that previously received impossible retrieval practice when 
compared with control categories.   
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4. GENERAL METHOD 
 
4.1  Material and Design  
          Eight categories were taken from Storm et al. (2006).  For each category, three 
possible two-letter stems were recruited from the original Storm et al. materials that 
were each unique and could be completed with existing members of the category (see 
appendix A).  Additionally, for each category, three different two-letter stems were 
designed such that no possible member could be produced using the stem cue.  This 
resulted in a slight modification of the original Storm et al. materials, given that they 
observed some possible member retrieval for certain impossible stem cues (see appendix 
B).   
          For each participant, four categories were assigned as control categories that were 
never presented during retrieval practice and only appeared during the category 
generation task.  Two categories were assigned to receive possible retrieval practice, and 
the remaining two categories were assigned to receive impossible retrieval practice.  
Categories were counterbalanced between subjects such that each category appeared in 
each condition equally often.  Each participant performed category generation one 
category at a time for all eight categories.  Two control categories were always presented 
first, followed by two impossible categories, and two possible categories.  The remaining 
control categories were presented last.   
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4.2  Procedure 
          Participants were run individually or in groups of up to eight people.  They were 
instructed to complete retrieval practice trials with the stipulation that they would be 
completing fill-in-the-blank problems in which they would see a category followed by 
the first two letters of a member of the category and that they should write down the 
member that completes the stem on the sheet in front of them that consisted of numbered 
blanks.  An example was given for a category that was not part of the experiment (Tools: 
ha______; hammer is the correct response).  Participants were told to expect repetitions 
and that some of the items may be more difficult than others, but they were encouraged 
to spend the entire time attempting to think of the member.  They were then presented 
with three continuous blocks of 12 items, each for five seconds.  Of these 12 items, six 
were possible stems, three of which were paired with one category and three paired with 
a different category.  The remaining six were unique impossible stems, three paired with 
one category and three paired with a different category.  Each block presented items in a 
different semi-random order such that no more than two items belonging to the same 
category were presented subsequently.  Participants were naïve to the fact that half of the 
stems were impossible to complete. 
          Participants were then asked to complete a difficult maze for five minutes as a 
distractor task.  If they finished before the allotted time, they were given a different maze 
to complete.  Most participants spent the entire time working on the first maze.  Then, 
participants were told that they would be completing a separate second experiment in 
which they would be presented with a sheet of paper with a category name at the top.  
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They were asked to try to list as many members of the category as possible within the 
time interval.  Participants generated members for eight different categories for one 
minute each.  They were then debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
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5. EXPERIMENT 1 
 
5.1  Participants  
          Fifty-two undergraduates (38 females) volunteered for credit in an introductory 
psychology course.  Participants were treated ethically according to the IRB. 
5.2  Results  
          According to a 2X4 mixed-factors ANOVA in which the within-subjects factor 
was type of retrieval practice and the between-subjects factor was counterbalancing 
condition, the proportion of trials for which participants gave any type of response 
during the retrieval practice trials differed significantly between possible and impossible 
trials, F(1, 48)=609.75, MSE=0 .01,  p<.001.  There was no main effect of 
counterbalancing condition on the proportion of answered trials, F(3, 48)=0.41, MSE= 
0.02,  p>.05.  Additionally, the interaction between counterbalancing and type of trial 
was also nonsignificant, F(3, 48)=2.71, MSE= 0.02, p>.05.  Participants provided 
responses, on average, on significantly more possible retrieval practice trials (M=0.67, 
SE=0.02) when compared with impossible trials (M=.08, SE=0.01), t(51)=23.53, d = 
252.04, p<.001.                 
          The control, possible, and impossible categories did not differ in the number of  
responses generated during the category generation task according to a 3X4 mixed-
factors ANOVA, where the type of category was within-subjects and the 
counterbalancing condition was between-subjects, F(2, 96)=0.07, MSE= 2.26,  p>.05.  
The control category resulted in an average of 8.9 responses (SE=0.34), the impossible 
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category resulted in 9.0 average responses (SE=0.50), and the possible category resulted 
in 9.0 average responses (SE=0.37).  There was also no main effect of counterbalancing 
condition on the number of responses generated, F(3, 48)=2.45, MSE= 9.14,  p>.05.   
          The control, possible, and impossible categories differed in average novelty of 
generated responses according to a 3X4 mixed-factors ANOVA, where the type of 
category was within-subjects and the counterbalancing condition was between-subjects, 
F(2, 96)=6.27, MSE= 77.22, p<.01.  The average novelty, according to a planned paired-
samples t-test, for generated members belonging to control categories (M=26.16, 
SE=1.44) was significantly less than the average novelty of members belonging to 
impossible categories (M=32.09, SE=1.94), t(51)=-2.14, d = -24.96, p<.05.  The 
difference between the average novelty of control categories and possible categories 
(M=30.35, SE=2.05) failed to reach significance, t(51)=-1.55, p>.05.  
          A follow-up analysis was conducted by excluding all responses generated for any 
of the three different category types (control, possible, impossible) that began with the 
possible two-letter stems used for that particular category (see Appendix C).  Although 
there was a main effect of type of category on the number of responses generated 
according to a 3X4 mixed-factors ANOVA, where the type of category was within-
subjects and the counterbalancing condition was between-subjects, F(2, 96)=5.24, MSE= 
2.28,  p<.01, follow-up paired-samples t-tests revealed no significant differences in the 
number of responses generated between possible categories (M=7.23, SE=0.39) and 
control categories (M=7.80, SE=0.31), t(51)=-1.38, p>.05.  Similarly, the number of 
responses did not differ between possible and impossible categories (M=8.18, SE=0.48), 
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t(51)=-1.29, p>.05.  There was also no main effect of counterbalancing condition on the 
number of responses generated, F(3, 48)=2.32, MSE= 7.54,  p>.05. 
          When looking at average novelty scores with excluded responses that fit possible 
stems, the control, possible, and impossible categories differed in average novelty of 
generated responses according to a 3X4 mixed-factors ANOVA, where the type of 
category was within-subjects and the counterbalancing condition was between-subjects, 
F(2, 96)=5.41, MSE= 97.21, p<.01.  The average novelty, according to a planned paired-
samples t-test, for generated members belonging to control categories (M=26.85, 
SE=1.47) was significantly less than the average novelty of members belonging to 
impossible categories (M=33.15, SE=2.07), t(51)=-2.14, d = -25.29, p<.05.  The 
difference between the average novelty of control categories and possible categories 
(M=29.27, SE=2.28) failed to reach significance, t(51)=-0.83, d = -9.07, p>.05.  
          If participants were generating any type of response during the impossible 
retrieval practice trials, it could be argued that those responses acted to block the pre-
potent, common members during category generation.  Alternatively, perhaps those 
participants who retrieved any type of response during impossible retrieval practice were 
also more likely to benefit from divergent thinking, thus resulting in increased novelty 
scores during category generation.  Both of these explanations would not require an 
inhibitory mechanism to suppress pre-potent responses that interfered during impossible 
retrieval practice.  In order to test these alternatives, a median split analysis, based on the 
number of responses provided during impossible retrieval practice trials (for a similar 
analysis, see Storm et al., 2006), was conducted on the novelty scores generated.   
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          Twenty-six participants, roughly half of the 13 from each of the four 
counterbalancing conditions (n = 8, 5, 8, 5), failed to retrieve any response during 
impossible retrieval practice trials.  The remaining 26 participants responded during an 
average of 2.85 of the 18 impossible trials.  Although there were clear differences in the 
number of responses generated during impossible trials between the two groups, those 
participants who responded during impossible trials did not differ in the average number 
of responses provided during possible trials (M=12.46, SE=0.53) when compared with 
the number of responses from those participants who failed to respond during impossible 
trials (M=11.73, SE=0.66), t(50)=0.86, p>.05. 
          Participants who responded during impossible trials did not exhibit a main effect 
of type of category on the number of responses that were generated during category 
generation, according to a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA, F(2, 50)=0.62, MSE= 
7.81,  p>.05.  Similarly, participants who failed to respond during impossible trials did 
not exhibit a main effect of type of category on the number of responses that were 
generated during category generation, according to a one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA, F(2, 50)=0.69, MSE= 8.69,  p>.05.  However, participants who responded 
during impossible trials did not exhibit a main effect of type of category on the novelty 
of responses that were generated during category generation, according to a one-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA, F(2, 50)=0.65, MSE= 166.19,  p>.05.  As expected, and in 
support of the retrieval inhibition explanation, participants who failed to respond during 
impossible trials did exhibit a main effect of type of category on the novelty of responses 
that were generated during category generation, according to a one-way repeated-
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measures ANOVA, F(2, 50)=4.50, MSE= 167.90,  p<.05.  A paired samples t-test 
confirmed that, for these participants, average novelty was significantly lower for 
generated members belonging to control categories (M=23.67, SE=1.75) than the 
average novelty of members belonging to impossible categories (M=34.39, SE=2.72), 
t(25)=-2.76, d = -54.56, p<.025.  The difference between the average novelty of control 
categories and possible categories (M=28.10, SE=2.77) failed to reach significance, 
t(25)=-1.23, d = -13.94, p>.05.  
5.3  Discussion  
          The results confirmed the prediction that categories for which participants receive 
impossible retrieval practice would result in greater novelty scores when compared with 
those categories that participants were never exposed to during retrieval practice.  It is 
important to mention, as Storm et al. (2006) have pointed out, that one might expect the 
pre-potent members to receive even more strengthening in accessibility during the 
impossible retrieval practice trials since they are most likely to come to mind and 
compete for access.  However, if this was the case, we would see an even greater number 
of common, less novel, responses generated when compared with those generated for 
control categories.   
          In addition, one might argue, as has been suggested as an alternative explanation 
for observations attributed to retrieval inhibition, that, although participants overtly 
generated very few responses on impossible trials, covertly, possibly unintentionally, 
accessed incorrect answers could become strengthened and potentially interfere with 
later recall of once pre-potent responses (see Storm et al., 2006).  It is possible, perhaps, 
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that the increase in novelty following failures to retrieve a correct response is actually 
due to an increased opportunity for divergent thinking, rather than due to an opportunity 
for retrieval inhibition.  Experiment 2 was designed to test this alternative explanation.  
Control categories received an additional trial for category generation.  The average 
novelty could then be compared between impossible categories and the second attempt 
for control categories.  If the impossible retrieval practice trials are offering the chance 
for people to consider more novel members, then we should expect similar increases in 
novelty scores for control categories on the second generation trial.   
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6. EXPERIMENT 2 
 
6.1  Participants  
          Thirty-two undergraduates (22 females) volunteered for credit in an introductory 
psychology course.  Participants were treated ethically according to the IRB. 
6.2  Method  
          The materials and design were the same as those in Experiment 1, except for two 
changes.  First, the distractor task was increased to ten minutes in order to reduce 
accessibility to the responses participants may have been considering during impossible 
retrieval practice.  Second, participants were asked to generate new members that had 
not been previously generated for an additional minute for each of the four control 
categories.  These repeated category trials always came after the initial eight different 
categories had been presented.  The first two repeated categories were presented 
immediately after both had been initially presented (e.g., Insects, Trees, Insects, Trees), 
while the final two repeated categories were those that had been presented first at the 
beginning of the generation task (delayed repeated). 
6.3  Results 
          According to a 2X4 mixed-factors ANOVA in which the within-subjects factor 
was type of retrieval practice and the between-subjects factor was counterbalancing 
condition, the proportion of trials for which participants gave any type of response 
during the retrieval practice trials differed significantly between possible and impossible 
trials, F(1, 28)=176.14, MSE=0 .03,  p<.001.  There was no main effect of 
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counterbalancing condition on the proportion of answered trials, F(1, 28)=0.59, MSE= 
0.04,  p>.05.  Additionally, the interaction between counterbalancing and type of trial 
was also nonsignificant, F(3, 28)=0.88, MSE= 0.03, p>.05.  Participants provided 
responses, on average, on significantly more possible retrieval practice trials (M=0.62, 
SE=0.04) when compared with impossible trials (M=.08, SE=0.02), t(51)=13.35, p<.001.  
          The control, possible, impossible, immediate repeated, and delayed repeated 
categories differed in number of responses generated according to a 5X4 mixed-factors 
ANOVA where the type of category was within-subjects and the counterbalancing 
condition was between-subjects, F(4, 112)=119.55, MSE= 2.43, p<.001.  There was no 
difference in the number of responses generated for immediate repeated (M=3.63, 
SE=0.43) and delayed repeated categories (M=4.27, SE=0.39), t(31)=-0.84, p>.05.  
However, both the immediate repeated and delayed repeated categories differed in the 
number of responses generated when compared with the control (M=9.45, SE=0.33), 
possible (M=9.70, SE=0.64), and impossible categories (M=9.11, SE=0.56).   
          The average novelty of generated responses differed across conditions according 
to a 5X4 mixed-factors ANOVA, F(4, 112)=22.92, MSE= 185.06, p<.001.  The average 
novelty, according to a planned paired-samples t-test, for generated members belonging 
to control categories (M=29.67, SE=1.31) was significantly less than the average novelty 
of members belonging to impossible categories (M=34.60, SE=1.82), t(31)=-2.09, d = -
18.06, p<.05.  However, the average novelty for members generated belonging to 
impossible categories was also significantly less than the average novelty for members 
generated during immediately repeated categories (M=51.07, SE=4.35), t(31)=-3.45, d = 
 29 
 
 
-28.06, p<.001, in addition to being less than the average novelty for members generated 
during the delayed repeated categories (M=55.98, SE=4.09), t(31)=-4.38, d = -38.57, 
p<.001. 
6.4  Discussion  
          Although the results replicated the initial finding in Experiment 1 in that larger 
novelty scores were observed following impossible retrieval practice when compared to 
category generation following no retrieval practice, the novelty scores were even larger 
during a second attempt at generating new members.  It could be possible, then, that the 
failures during impossible retrieval practice trials are successful in providing an 
opportunity to consider alternative members, without recruiting an adaptive inhibitory 
mechanism to suppress pre-potent responses.  Similar to the initial generation attempt in 
the control condition, the impossible retrieval practice trials may strengthen novel 
responses that are considered as possible targets during retrieval practice.  Participants 
simply might have run out of time to list items that were strengthened and mentally 
generated during a given generation trial.  Thus, the largest benefit for novel response 
generation was observed during the repeated trial, which is most likely due to an 
increase in time to list novel members.   
          The ability to access novel items, regardless of whether it is caused by retrieval 
inhibition or by an opportunity to think divergently, is a useful tool for tasks requiring 
creative thinking and problem solving.  As discussed, implicitly caused fixation is often 
difficult to avoid, even when participants are instructed to do so (Jansson & Smith, 
1991).  It is possible that participants might ward off potential implicit fixation by 
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working through failures to retrieve targets.  The purpose of Experiment 3 was to apply 
the benefit of failed retrieval to a similar generation task in which participants are 
prompted to be creative.  It is expected that creative responses will receive higher 
novelty scores for categories that receive impossible retrieval when compared with 
scores for categories that do not receive impossible retrieval practice. 
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7. EXPERIMENT 3 
 
7.1  Participants  
          Thirty-two undergraduates (16 females) volunteered for credit in an introductory 
psychology course.  Participants were treated ethically according to the IRB. 
7.2  Method  
          The materials and design were the same as those in Experiment 1, except for one 
change.  The category generation task was replaced with a single-item response task for 
each of the eight categories.  The order of the categories remained the same.  Participants 
were instructed to write the most creative member of the category.  They were told that 
the creative member had to belong to the category.  Participants were presented with 
each category for five seconds and asked to write their responses on a blank sheet of 
paper.      
7.3  Results 
          According to a 2X4 mixed-factors ANOVA in which the within-subjects factor 
was type of retrieval practice and the between-subjects factor was counterbalancing 
condition, the proportion of trials for which participants gave any type of response 
during the retrieval practice trials differed significantly between possible and impossible 
trials, F(1, 28)=243.88, MSE=0 .02,  p<.001.  There was no main effect of 
counterbalancing condition on the proportion of answered trials, F(3, 28)=0.30, MSE= 
0.02,  p>.05.  Additionally, the interaction between counterbalancing and type of trial 
was also nonsignificant, F(1, 28)=1.63, MSE= 0.02, p>.05.  Participants provided 
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responses, on average, on significantly more possible retrieval practice trials (M=0.68, 
SE=0.03) when compared with impossible trials (M=.09, SE=0.02), t(31)=15.41, p<.001.                 
          The control, possible, and impossible categories differed only numerically in 
average novelty of generated responses according to a 3X4 mixed-factors ANOVA 
where the type of category was within-subjects and the counterbalancing condition was 
between-subjects, F(2, 56)=3.01, MSE= 546.74, p=.057.  However, the average novelty, 
according to a planned paired-samples t-test, for generated members belonging to 
control categories (M=28.21, SE=2.62) was significantly less than the average novelty of 
members belonging to impossible categories (M=41.19, SE=5.48), t(31)=-2.30, d = -
17.10, p<.05.   
          A follow-up analysis was conducted by excluding all responses generated for any 
of the three different category types (control, possible, impossible) that began with the 
possible two-letter stems used for that particular category.  When looking at average 
novelty scores with excluded responses that fit possible stems, the control, possible, and 
impossible categories differed in average novelty of generated responses according to a 
3X4 mixed-factors ANOVA, where the type of category was within-subjects and the 
counterbalancing condition was between-subjects, F(2, 56)=3.21, MSE=678.89, p<.05.  
The average novelty, according to a planned paired-samples t-test, for generated 
members belonging to control categories (M=28.60, SE=2.64) was significantly less than 
the average novelty of members belonging to impossible categories (M=44.72, 
SE=6.33), t(31)=-2.49, d = -18.77, p<.025.  The difference between the average novelty 
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of control categories and possible categories (M=39.76, SE=6.61) failed to reach 
significance, t(31)=-1.82, d = -12.52, p>.05.  
7.4  Discussion  
          The increased novelty scores following impossible retrieval practice further 
extends the finding that a failed retrieval attempt can provide access to novel responses 
that might have otherwise been blocked by more common responses.  If impossible 
retrieval practice trials allow for an inhibitory control mechanism, we might expect to 
see the most evidence of facilitated access to novel responses in instances where people 
are instructed not only to provide creative responses, but when they must overcome 
interfering information.  Smith et al. (1993) showed evidence of induced fixation in an 
idea generation task even when participants were instructed to avoid conforming to 
presented examples.  However, in our creative response task, participants were never 
presented with examples or fixating items.  It was only in Experiments 1 and 2 where 
participants induced their own fixation by generating common category members where 
a significant difference in novelty scores was found across types of categories.  It is 
possible that we might have observed larger differences in novelty scores between 
impossible and control categories had we presented common category members prior to 
the creative response task.     
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8. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
8.1  Summary of Results  
          Forgetting fixation via retrieval inhibition was proposed to account for the 
increased accessibility of novel category members during a category generation task.  
Participants failed at retrieving targets they believed to belong to a category when 
prompted with two letters that could not be completed with an actual member of the 
category (also see Storm et al., 2006) and later were more likely to generate novel 
category members.  According to the theory of retrieval inhibition, even an impossible 
retrieval practice trial should produce competition from pre-potent, common, category 
members, which must subsequently be suppressed in order to attempt to retrieve targets 
mistakenly believed to actually exist (Storm et al., 2006).  Similarly, in this set of 
experiments, it was predicted that during the failure to retrieve targets participants would 
recruit retrieval inhibition to suppress non-target members that would interfere and 
compete for retrieval (Anderson et al., 1994).  This prediction follows from 
investigations in the role of retrieval inhibition in overcoming fixation in problem 
solving (e.g., Angello et al., 2014; Koppel & Storm, 2014; Storm & Angello, 2010; 
Storm et al., 2011).  The aim of this study was to exploit the retrieval-induced forgetting 
of common category members during impossible retrieval practice trials in order to grant 
access to novel members on a future generation task. 
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8.2  Retrieval-induced Forgetting for Semantic Memory  
          It is important to point out that the effects of retrieval-induced forgetting, as 
measured by increased novelty scores, was observed in three experiments without the 
use of a study phase to ensure the existence of competing pre-potent non targets.  To 
date, only one study, by Johnson and Anderson (2004), has provided evidence of 
retrieval-induced forgetting following retrieving category members with category-two-
letter stem cues (Experiment 2) without a study phase to instill episodic fixation 
(however, see Levy, McVeigh, Marful, & Anderson, 2007 for retrieval-induced 
forgetting following a picture naming task).  The evidence of these studies helps 
illustrate the potency of retrieval-induced forgetting, in that it can arise for semantic 
items and not only for competitors that interfere due to episodic memory.   
8.3  Individual Differences 
          Storm and Angello (2010) demonstrated improved ability to overcome fixation 
and solve RAT problems for individuals who also demonstrated greater levels of 
retrieval-induced forgetting following retrieval practice for category members.  This 
result suggests a link between the kind of cognitive control mechanisms that support 
retrieval and generating creative solutions in the face of avoiding interfering 
information.  Experiment 1 and 2 of this study showed increased novelty averages of 
generated members following failures to retrieve category members.  An increase in 
novelty of generated responses may be the result of reduced accessibility of common 
pre-potent responses that typically bock access to more novel responses.  Benedek and 
Neubauer (2013) demonstrated a shared tendency for both high and low creative 
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individuals, as measured by divergent thinking ability tests, to generate starting with 
most common responses, then later providing more novel, less common responses.  They 
argued that highly creative thinkers are better able to efficiently generate both common 
and uncommon responses by working to make the best use of the time during the 
generation task, allowing for generation of more total members.  Interestingly, across 
two experiments we did not find an increase in the total number of generated responses 
following impossible retrieval practice, which may suggest that participants did not need 
to make the most efficient use of their time to access less common responses following 
common ones that are typically generated first.  The increased access to novel category 
members, instead, may be due to reduced access to common, pre-potent members. 
          Participants in Experiment 1 were split based on a median split for each 
counterbalancing on the number of responses provided during impossible retrieval 
practice trials.  It was found that only those participants who failed to provide a response 
during impossible retrieval practice trials exhibited greater novelty scores following 
impossible retrieval practice trials.  A similar analysis was performed by Storm et al. 
(2006) in order to counter the alternative explanation of interference from responses 
generated during impossible retrieval practice accounting for retrieval-induced forgetting 
of competing targets.  Although our analysis is consistent with their findings, it can be 
interpreted that the participants who fail to retrieve an incorrect answer are more likely 
to spend time considering alternative members that fit the category but do not fit the 
two-letter stem.  This non-inhibitory explanation, then, could explain why only these 
participants show increased novelty in generated responses.  It will be informative to test 
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applications of this type of “inside the box” thinking as a successful brainstorming tool, 
especially given the current consensus that deviant and divergent thinking is a useful 
creative skill (e.g., Benedek and Neubauer, 2013).  In fact, past work has demonstrated 
the use of instructions that are aimed to constrain idea generation in preventing 
conformity to presented examples (Landau & Leynes, 2004).       
8.4  Alternative Explanations 
          One problem with the retrieval inhibition explanation is that increased access to 
novel members does not necessarily require reduced access for common responses.  For 
instance, an automatic spreading activation mechanism (e.g., Neely, 1977) may work to 
activate and prime novel category members during impossible retrieval practice trials, 
without requiring inhibitory suppression of common members.  Quillian (1967) 
proposed the existence of a semantic network that spreads activation to related concepts 
to facilitate memory search and language comprehension.  This type of network would 
make sense to account for the order of items generated because common members are 
more likely to share multiple connections with related items in the semantic network, 
and are thus more likely to be activated by priming (Collins & Loftus, 1975).      
          Automatic spreading activation (ASA; e.g., Neely, 1977) occurs rapidly and 
without intentional strategy or attentional resources, a mechanism that is very different 
than a retrieval inhibition mechanism recruited to overcome fixation and resolve 
response competition.   However, according to theories involving ASA (e.g., Anderson, 
1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975), activation decays rapidly in the absence of conscious 
attentional processing.  Loftus (1973) directly tested spread time using a category 
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exemplar retrieval task.  She presented participants with a category name and one-letter-
stem exemplar cue (e.g., fruit-A).  Participants were told to name the first exemplar to 
come to mind using the cue.  Loftus manipulated the number of intervening categories 
that followed an initial category presentation before that category was presented a 
second time.  For example, in the lag 2 condition, a participant might be presented with 
(fruit-A, animal-D, color-B, fruit-P).  She found that reaction time for the second 
presentation of the repeated category increased linearly as a function of the number of 
intervening filler categories.  This suggests that any activation that spread to additional 
exemplars during the initial category presentation did not continue during the lag time.  
Furthermore, the actual spread time would have been brief in order to boost facilitation 
about a second later in the lag 0 condition, while providing less facilitation about three 
seconds later in the lag 2 condition.  Interpolation, in fact, would show almost no 
facilitation, meaning no reduction in reaction time, for the second presentation of the 
repeated category at a lag 3 condition.  Similarly, McNamara (1992) found that 
facilitation, reduced reaction time, during a lexical decision task caused by priming from 
a related word (e.g., maple primed syrup) disappeared at the lag 2 condition.  In other 
words, when two filler words separated the prime and the related word, there was no 
reduction in reaction time for the related word compared to reaction times for trials 
without related primes. 
          If novel category members are primed and activated via spreading activation 
during the impossible retrieval practice task, it would require participants to actively 
make attempts to think back to incorrect items that were retrieved during impossible 
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retrieval practice, given the evidence for the rapid decay of automatic spreading 
activation.  Future work will need to explore the role of active and explicit attempts to 
recollect information retrieved during impossible retrieval practice and the benefit of 
retrieval-induced forgetting on the generation of novel responses.  If this experimental 
design is to provide inspiration for the development of a brainstorming tool to aid 
creative idea generation and problem solving, the boundary conditions, such as whether 
participants must intentionally recollect responses retrieved during initial failures should 
be understood.           
           Experiment 2 also found greater novelty averages for categories that did not 
receive impossible retrieval practice but did receive an initial category generation 
opportunity.  The result of Experiment 2 support a non-inhibitory explanation, such that 
the failed retrieval practice trials allow for divergent thinking opportunities because 
participants, during continue failure, have more opportunity to access a greater number 
of alternatives.  According to this explanation, then, it is beneficial for participants to 
actively try to remember the responses that they retrieved during impossible retrieval 
practice trials during the category generation task, similar to the facilitation in accessing 
novel members that is observed during a second category generation attempt.  Similar to 
the automatic spreading activation account for the results, opportunity to access a greater 
number of alternatives allows for increased access to novel, less common responses 
without reduced access to common, pre-potent responses.   
          One limitation with using a repeated category generation task that instructs 
participants to list new members is the task becomes more difficult by introducing 
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increased output interference.  Participants must think back to the previously generated 
members in order to avoid repeating the same members on the second generation task.  
Despite this difficulty, however, participants were still able to generate members that 
were, on average, more novel than both those generated initially and those generated 
following impossible retrieval practice.  It could be that inhibitory processes are more 
likely to be recruited during difficult tasks that introduce more potential for output 
interference.   
8.5  Future Directions 
          Future work should test whether individuals who show high levels of retrieval-
induced forgetting are also better able to generate more novel members on a second 
generation attempt where they are told to avoid listing members that have previously 
been listed.  According to work by Storm and Angello (2010), participants who are more 
likely to exhibit retrieval-induced forgetting for competitive non-targets should also be 
more likely to overcome fixation from irrelevant information.  Applying this 
phenomenon to avoiding output interference in category generation could help shed light 
on the generality of the retrieval inhibition mechanism.   
          Furthermore, as Koppel and Storm (2014) have mentioned, greater ability for 
retrieval inhibition is only helpful for overcoming fixation in circumstances in which 
participants have difficulty forgetting blockers or misleading information.  Perhaps when 
participants are thinking back to items that came to mind during impossible retrieval 
practice, they experience less difficulty in forgetting pre-potent responses.  The benefit 
of failed retrieval attempts in accessing novel responses should be tested under 
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conditions of time pressure, high stress, or increased fixation to see whether participants 
can recruit retrieval-induced forgetting of pre-potent responses to assist in generating 
novel responses.  
          It is possible that if participants are instructed to generate common responses we 
might also observe a similar difference in novelty scores.  If it is the case that impossible 
retrieval practice trials result in retrieval-induced forgetting of pre-potent, common 
category members, these items should continue to experience limited accessibility and 
would be less likely to be generated even following a prompt to produce a common 
response.  Alternatively, if impossible retrieval practice trials are not leading to reduced 
access for pre-potent responses but, instead, are resulting in greater access for novel 
responses given the opportunity for divergent thinking during failures to retrieve a target, 
we should not observe a difference in novelty between categories when participants are 
instructed to generate a common response.  
8.6  Practical Applications 
          Experiment 3 demonstrated a trend toward people exhibiting better access to novel 
responses when given a creative prompt.  However, this result should be tested with 
divergent thinking tasks and when common examples are provided to induce fixation to 
explore the extent of the increased accessibility for novel items.   
          A next step for applying this method to a more useful task could be to replace the 
categories used in these experiments with ad hoc categories (e.g., cold things, heavy 
things; see Barsalou, 1983).  These categories consist of multiple sub categories, and it 
would be interesting to test for the role of retrieval-induced forgetting for an entire 
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category that may be unwanted or unhelpful for the generation of novel members.  In 
addition, alternative measures of increased access for novel responses should be 
explored, such as the variety of sub categories explored or the quality/utility of generated 
responses.  Given the tendency for greater novelty to arise when participants fail to write 
incorrect responses during impossible retrieval practice, it may be the case that failures 
to retrieve wrong answers and failure to deviate too far from the definition of the target 
category can be helpful for producing useful novel responses, rather than any type of 
novel response.   
          Kohn and Smith (2011) showed evidence of collaborative fixation brought on by 
group brainstorming sessions.  Investigations into the dynamics of retrieval-induced 
forgetting during group brainstorming can offer potential mechanisms to help offset 
collaborative fixation.  Hirst and Echterhoff (2008) argued that socially-shared retrieval-
induced forgetting (SS-RIF) can occur in contexts such as conversations between two or 
more people because silenced memories are more likely to occur, given conversational 
selective remembering and the limits of time and opportunity for the broad search 
required for retrieval-induced facilitation (see Chan, McDermott, & Roediger, 2006).  In 
a study that used conversations between two participants to test the propagation of SS-
RIF, Coman and Hirst (2012) observed changes in attitudes in support of euthanasia 
when retrieval-induced forgetting took place for arguments made against euthanasia 
practices.  Of importance, they found this pattern following conversations between two 
participants with similar initial moderate attitudes regarding euthanasia.  They attributed 
these results to the fact that people are less likely to assert alternative views when 
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conversing with someone who holds similar attitudes as themselves.  This silence of 
arguments that were previously selected against, which had undergone retrieval-induced 
forgetting, allowed continued forgetting to propagate from an initial setting to the 
conversation between participants.  This change in context, they explained simulated 
people listening to a political debate in favor of euthanasia and later talking to people 
with similar views, such as close friends, about the arguments mentioned in the debate.  
Given that socially presented information also has the potential to influence 
collaborative idea generation, the social dynamics between innovators and creative 
problem solvers should be taken into consideration, especially since people are more 
likely to collaborate with and be influenced by thinkers sharing similar views (see also 
Coman, Stone, Castano, & Hirst, 2014).   
            The biasing influences of RIF on decisions and judgments are, in fact, more 
likely when listeners of a conversation question a speaker’s expertise or credibility 
because they are likely to covertly selectively retrieve along with the overt selective 
retrieval of the speaker (Cuc, Koppel, & Hirst, 2007).  Fortunately, conversations with 
other people holding divergent attitudes can prevent the propagation of retrieval-induced 
and its subsequent influence on attitudes.  Coman and Hirst explain that this occurs 
because non-dominant speakers are motivated to initiate a broader and more complete 
retrieval in order to support arguments that conflict with the dominant speaker.  Coman 
et al. (2014) provide additional support for motivated recall in overcoming retrieval-
induced forgetting for relevant information following selective retrieval practice using 
the context of moral-disengagement when justifying atrocity.    
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           Fortunately for creative thinking, however, questioning the ideas generated or 
monitoring the ideas generated for accuracy may produce beneficial SS-RIF and help 
creative thinkers overcome fixation collaboratively.  It will prove informative to test for 
instances in which people selectively covertly retrieve when someone else is sharing an 
idea and whether SS-RIF can occur for common, unwanted ideas during brainstorming 
tasks.  
          Taking a break to help forget unwanted and interfering information may not 
always be a feasible option.  The ability to limit access to unwanted information may 
allow creative solutions to come to mind.  This study suggests that more time spent 
working to ward off future fixation can be helpful for generating less common, novel 
responses.  If interfering information from recent experience or implicit assumptions can 
be forgotten while experiencing failure at a related task, increased time spent working, 
even when it appears to be counterproductive, may result in reduced biases and less 
fixation.  If future work shows evidence for inhibitory control resulting in greater 
forgetting for incorrect competing responses with increased failures during problem 
solving, creative problem solvers might be more motivated to continue attempting the 
impossible. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
Category: Possible Responses 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Fruits: Lemon, Orange, Pineapple 
Drinks: Whiskey, Ale, Bourbon 
Weapons: Pistol, Bomb, Club 
Professions: Farmer, Nurse, Plumber 
Metals: Silver, Brass, Gold 
Fish: Trout, Guppy, Bluegill 
Insects: Roach, Mosquito, Grasshopper 
Trees: Redwood, Spruce, Elm 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Category: Impossible Two-Letter Stems 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Fruits: an___, fl____, ge_______ 
Drinks: ce_____, na_____, oc___ 
Weapons: ow____, va__, fu___ 
Professions: vu____, ti_____, gi___ 
Metals: lo__, ja___, ve____ 
Fish: wu___, di______, ka______ 
Insects: sh__, wi___, sq____ 
Trees: aj___, pu______, te______ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX C 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Experiment 1 Category Members and Novelty Scores  
* Possible Responses  
 
Professions 
doctor 5.55556 
lawyer 7.14286 
teacher 7.14286 
engineer 11.1111 
psychologist 11.1111 
police officer  12.5 
*nurse 14.2857 
accountant 16.6667 
firefighter 16.6667 
manager 20 
banker 25 
biologist 25 
dentist 25 
janitor 25 
professor 25 
actress/actor 33.3333 
business 33.3333 
chef 33.3333 
chemist 33.3333 
physical 
therapist 
33.3333 
scientist 33.3333 
surgeon 33.3333 
veterinarian 33.3333 
architect 50 
athlete 50 
baker 50 
*baseball 
player 
50 
coach 50 
counselor 50 
dancer 50 
electrician 50 
EMT 50 
entrepreneur 50 
*farmer 50 
florist 50 
*football 
player 
50 
geologist 50 
judge 50 
librarian 50 
mechanical engineer 50 
occupational 
therapist 
50 
pharmacist 50 
physician 50 
*plumber 50 
politician 50 
psychiatrist 50 
sales clerk 50 
secretary 50 
sociologist 50 
technician 50 
therapist 50 
trainer 50 
waiter 50 
writer 50 
 model 100 
administrator 100 
agent 100 
analyst 100 
anesthesiologist 100 
anthropologist 100 
archeologist 100 
artist 100 
assistant 
professor 
100 
associate 
professor 
100 
astronaut 100 
astronomer 100 
baby sitter 100 
bagger 100 
barista 100 
*basketball 
player 
100 
beautician 100 
blacksmith 100 
brain surgeon 100 
broom sweeper 100 
bus driver 100 
butcher 100 
butler 100 
car driver 100 
cardiologist 100 
cashier 100 
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CEO 100 
CFO 100 
chemical 
engineer 
100 
child 
psychologist 
100 
civil engineer 100 
cleaners 100 
clerk 100 
clinical 
psychologist 
100 
computer 
analyst 
100 
computer 
programmer 
100 
congress 
member 
100 
construction  100 
councilor 100 
criminal justice 100 
custodian 100 
designer 100 
diagnostician 100 
dietician 100 
director 100 
driver 100 
education 100 
ER doctor 100 
executive 100 
executive 
assistant 
100 
*fashion 
designer 
100 
financial 
analyst 
100 
flight attendant 100 
food service 
worker 
100 
forensic 
anthropologist 
100 
founder 100 
garbage man 100 
gardener 100 
general 
manager 
100 
geographer 100 
geothermal 
engineer 
100 
golfer 100 
grocer 100 
groundskeeper 100 
guitarist 100 
heart surgeon 100 
historian 100 
hostess 100 
house keeper 100 
HR 100 
insurance agent 100 
investor 100 
IT 100 
jailer 100 
journalist 100 
law 
enforcement 
100 
locksmith 100 
magician 100 
maid 100 
maintenance 100 
makeup artist 100 
marketer 100 
marketing 100 
mathematician 100 
mechanic 100 
medical doctor 100 
medical 
sergeant 
100 
medicine 100 
military 100 
minesweeper 100 
mower 100 
musician 100 
nanny 100 
navy 
psychologist 
100 
network 
administrator  
100 
neurologist 100 
*nuclear 
engineer 
100 
*nutritionist 100 
OBGYN 100 
optometrist 100 
orthodontist 100 
paleontologist 100 
paralegal 100 
paramedic 100 
pastor 100 
pediatrician 100 
physicist 100 
pilot 100 
*plastic 
surgeon 
100 
postal carrier 100 
preacher 100 
president 100 
priest 100 
principal 100 
producer 100 
radiologist 100 
rancher 100 
realtor 100 
receptionist 100 
researcher 100 
restaurant 
manager 
100 
sales person 100 
senator 100 
singer 100 
skydiver 100 
small business 
owner 
100 
*soccer player 100 
social worker 100 
speech 
pathologist 
100 
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steward 100 
stock broker 100 
superintendent 100 
taxidermist 100 
teaching aide 100 
Texas ranger 100 
trader 100 
translator 100 
transportation 
worker 
100 
treasurer 100 
truck driver 100 
vet tech 100 
VP 100 
warehouse 
manager 
100 
*wedding 
planner 
100 
wrestler 100 
youth minister 100 
 
Weapons 
knives 4.761905 
guns 5.263158 
*bomb 9.090909 
sword 10 
*bow 14.28571 
grenades 14.28571 
arrow 16.66667 
bat 16.66667 
pistol 20 
rifle 20 
shot gun 25 
tank 25 
revolver 33.33333 
rope 33.33333 
3006 rifle 50 
ak-15 50 
ak-47 50 
axe 50 
brass 
knuckles 
50 
chemical 50 
machine gun 50 
nun-chucks 50 
poison 50 
22 100 
12 gauge 100 
20 gauge 100 
45 auto 100 
45mm 100 
ak-12 100 
army 100 
assault rifle 100 
*atomic 
bomb 
100 
bazooka 100 
BB gun 100 
biological  100 
blow darts  100 
bullet 100 
bursa 380 100 
canon 100 
*claw 100 
*club 100 
commando 100 
*crossbow 100 
daggers 100 
disease  100 
drone 100 
dynamite 100 
explosive 100 
fire 100 
fire launcher 100 
fist 100 
flamethrower 100 
Glock 100 
halberd 100 
hand gun 100 
javelin 100 
kali stick 100 
katana 100 
Katar 100 
lance 100 
m16 100 
m1911 100 
m416 100 
mace 100 
Macha 100 
machete 100 
missile 100 
musket 100 
needles 100 
ninja star 100 
nuclear 100 
*nuclear 
bomb 
100 
pepper spray 100 
pike 100 
razor blade 100 
rope line 100 
RPG 100 
Sai 100 
scythe 100 
semi auto 100 
shank 100 
short sword 100 
sling shot 100 
sniper 100 
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sniper rifle 100 
spear 100 
staff 100 
stake 100 
sub-machine 100 
switch blade 100 
syringe 100 
Taser 100 
throwing star 100 
tomahawk 100 
usas-12 100 
vz1 100 
whip 100 
Winchester 100 
wire sword 100 
 
Metals 
*silver 4.3478 
copper 4.5455 
*gold 4.5455 
aluminum 6.6667 
iron 6.6667 
platinum 7.6923 
steel 8.3333 
*bronze 11.111 
titanium 12.5 
magnesium 14.2857 
nickel 16.6667 
tin 16.6667 
cobalt 20 
lead 25 
zinc 25 
manganese 33.3333 
alkaline 50 
*brass 50 
mercury 50 
alloy 100 
antimony 100 
barium 100 
calcium 100 
chromium 100 
earth 100 
liquid metal 100 
lithium 100 
palladium 100 
potassium 100 
precious 100 
*rose gold 100 
semi-
precious 
100 
sheet metal 100 
silicon 100 
stainless 
steel 
100 
*sterling 
silver 
100 
strontium 100 
sulfite 100 
uranium 100 
*white gold 100 
zirconium 100 
 
Fish 
clown 4.5455 
salmon 7.1429 
gold fish 8.3333 
catfish 10 
shark 10 
bass 11.1111 
flounder 11.1111 
tuna 11.1111 
sword fish 12.5 
*trout 12.5 
beta 14.2857 
tilapia 16.6667 
angel 20 
red drum 20 
barracuda 25 
*blow fish 33.3333 
carp 33.3333 
cod 33.3333 
largemouth bass 33.3333 
perch 33.3333 
snapper 33.3333 
*black mollies 50 
*bluegill 50 
drum fish 50 
grouper 50 
*guppy 50 
lionfish 50 
mahi mahi 50 
marlin 50 
minnow 50 
molly 50 
piranha 50 
puffer fish 50 
rainbow fish 50 
red snapper 50 
small mouth 50 
 58 
 
 
bass 
white bass 50 
algae eater 100 
alligator gar 100 
*blue tang 100 
coy/koi 100 
crappie 100 
croaker 100 
dolphin fish 100 
dragon 100 
eel 100 
freshwater 100 
gar 100 
goblin shark 100 
great white 
shark 
100 
*Guadalupe 
bass 
100 
halibut 100 
king mackerel 100 
mola mola 100 
mullet 100 
mulloway 100 
pike 100 
piper fish 100 
*rainbow trout 100 
sail fish 100 
salt water 100 
sardines 100 
saw fish 100 
sea horse 100 
silver fish 100 
snook 100 
speckled 100 
stingray 100 
striped 100 
sucker 100 
sunfish 100 
sunset molly 100 
tiger barbs 100 
upside-down 
catfish 
100 
yellow tang 100 
 
Fruits 
banana 4.1667 
*orange 4.1667 
apple 4.3478 
strawberry 5 
grape 5.5556 
blueberries 6.25 
*pineapple 6.6667 
kiwi 7.1429 
mango 7.1429 
watermelon 7.1429 
tomato 7.6923 
cantaloupe 8.3333 
blackberry 9.0909 
raspberries 9.0909 
*lemon 11.111 
grape fruit 12.5 
cherry 14.2857 
honey dew 14.2857 
papaya 14.2857 
peach 14.2857 
pear 14.2857 
tangerine 14.2857 
dragon fruit 16.6667 
lime 16.6667 
pomegranate 16.6667 
melon 20 
guava 25 
plum 25 
apricot 33.3333 
avocado 33.3333 
nectarine 33.3333 
star fruit 33.3333 
coconut 50 
cucumber 50 
berry 100 
cactus 100 
cranberry 100 
durian 100 
fig 100 
gala apple 100 
granny smith 100 
kumquat 100 
longan 100 
lychee 100 
*Mandarin 
orange 
100 
mangosteen 100 
medlar fuit 100 
passion fruit 100 
persimmons 100 
plantain 100 
prune 100 
zucchini 100 
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Drinks 
water 4.1667 
beer 5.5556 
Coca-Cola 5.5556 
sprite 6.25 
dr. pepper 7.6923 
apple juice 8.3333 
lemonade 8.3333 
orange juice 8.3333 
tea 8.3333 
wine 9.0909 
coffee 10 
milk 10 
soda 12.5 
Pepsi 14.2857 
grape juice 16.6667 
mountain dew 16.6667 
hot chocolate 20 
root beer 20 
sweet tea 20 
Gatorade 25 
vodka 25 
*whiskey 25 
7up 33.3333 
*alcohol 33.3333 
cranberry juice 33.3333 
crush 33.3333 
rum 33.3333 
smoothie 33.3333 
sparkling water 33.3333 
big red 50 
coconut water 50 
diet coke 50 
energy drink 50 
fruit punch 50 
ginger-ale 50 
green tea 50 
iced tea 50 
juice 50 
liquor 50 
PowerAde 50 
punch 50 
red bull 50 
*ale 100 
*all-sport 100 
*almond milk 100 
Beverly 100 
big blue 100 
*booze 100 
bubble tea 100 
Bud light 100 
Budweiser 100 
Canada dry 100 
Capri sun 100 
cappuccino 100 
carbonated 
water 
100 
Chardonnay 100 
cherry vodka 
sour 
100 
chocolate milk 100 
cocktails 100 
coconut milk 100 
cognac 100 
cola 100 
Coors light 100 
Fanta 100 
Fanta 
pineapple 
100 
Fanta 
strawberry 
100 
flavored water 100 
fruit juice 100 
gin 100 
gin and tonic 100 
grape soda 100 
Heineken 100 
Hennessey 100 
hi-c 100 
jaeger 100 
Kombucha 100 
Kool-Aid 100 
lager 100 
lattes 100 
lime juice 100 
margarita 100 
martini 100 
milkshake 100 
mineral water 100 
mint julep 100 
mixed drinks 100 
monster 100 
Mr. Pibb 100 
orange soda 100 
peach soda 100 
peach tea 100 
piña colada 100 
prune juice 100 
red wine 100 
Sam Adams 100 
shake 100 
Shiner 100 
sierra mist 100 
soy milk 100 
spirits 100 
sprint 100 
tequila 100 
unsweet tea 100 
vegetable 100 
*white wine 100 
yoo-hoo 100 
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Insects 
ant 5.5556 
fly 5.8824 
butterfly 6.6667 
beetle 7.6923 
*mosquito 7.6923 
*grasshopper 8.3333 
caterpillar 9.0909 
*cockroach 10 
lady bug 11.111 
bee 12.5 
moth 14.285
7 
praying mantis 20 
wasp 20 
cricket 33.333 
fruit fly  33.333 
dragon fly 50 
honey bee 50 
house fly 50 
June bug 50 
stink bug 50 
walking stick  50 
worm 50 
*Aedes aegypti 
mosquito 
100 
black ants 100 
black fly 100 
bot fly 100 
bumblebee 100 
carpenter ant 100 
cicada 100 
click beetle 100 
dirt diver 100 
dung beetle 100 
fire ants 100 
firefly 100 
flea 100 
gnat 100 
horsefly 100 
katydid 100 
kissing bug 100 
lice 100 
locust 100 
maggots 100 
mayfly 100 
meal worms 100 
no-see-um 100 
rhino beetle 100 
sugar ants 100 
termite 100 
tse tse fly 100 
water bug 100 
yellow jacket 100 
 
Trees 
oak 4.3478 
pine 5 
apple 6.66667 
maple 11.1111 
cedar 12.5 
palm tree 16.6667 
evergreen 20 
orange 20 
pecan 20 
mesquite 25 
*redwood 25 
willow 25 
cherry-
blossom 
33.3333 
coconut 50 
deciduous 50 
*elm 50 
live oak 50 
magnolia 50 
peach 50 
ash 100 
Ashe juniper 100 
aspen 100 
avocado tree 100 
birch 100 
blueberry 100 
bois d'arc 100 
bonsai 100 
century 100 
cherry 100 
china berry 100 
Chinese 
plum 
 
100 
Christmas 100 
cotton wood 100 
cypress 100 
fern 100 
fig 100 
fir 100 
Fraser 100 
fruit trees 100 
ginkgo 100 
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grapefruit  100 
hickory 100 
juniper 100 
lemon 100 
lime  100 
mahogany 100 
mango tree 100 
mulberry 100 
olive 100 
pear 100 
pin oak 100 
plum 100 
post oak 100 
rain tree 100 
*red oak 100 
sequoia 100 
*Spanish oak 100 
*spruce 100 
sweet gum 100 
sycamore 100 
walnut 100 
weeping 
willow 
100 
white oak 100 
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